Abstract: This paper studies the role of Medicare's premium policy in sorting beneficiaries between traditional Medicare (TM) and managed care plans in the Medicare Advantage (MA) program. Beneficiaries vary in their demand for care. TM fully accommodates demand but creates a moral hazard inefficiency. MA rations care but disregards some elements of the demand. We describe an efficient assignment of beneficiaries to these two options, and argue that efficiency requires an MA program oriented to serve the large middle part of the distribution of demand: the "middle class." Current Medicare policy of a "single premium" for MA plans cannot achieve efficient assignment. We characterize the demand-based premium policy that can implement the efficient assignment of enrollees to plans. If only a single premium is feasible, the second-best policy involves too many of the low-demand individuals in MA and a too low level of services relative to the first best. We identify approaches to using premium policy to revitalize MA and improve the efficiency of Medicare.
Introduction
Beneficiaries in Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the elderly and disabled, have for some time chosen between two major options: traditional Medicare (TM) and a set of private health insurance plans, including managed care plans, offered under Medicare Part C. Presently, only about 25% of beneficiaries elect a Part C plan. The objectives of Part C, since 2003 known as Medicare Advantage (MA), 1 are to expand health insurance options for beneficiaries while taking advantage of economies of managed care to save money for Medicare. Achieving these dual objectives requires that
Medicare pay an MA plan less than what beneficiaries would cost Medicare in TM but more than cost for the beneficiaries in MA, leaving some savings to share with beneficiaries in the form of lower premiums/better coverage in MA to attract them to an MA plan. Research and policy have focused on the "risk adjustment" of Medicare payments to pay more for the sick and less for the healthy joining the MA plans. 2 In spite of improvements in risk adjustment technology and many other policy reforms, Part
C has yet, however, to save Medicare money (McGuire, Newhouse and Sinaiko, 2011).
As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Medicare payments to MA plans are being cut, and, based on experience, plan and beneficiary exit will follow; 3 but, based on the same experience, these cuts are unlikely to move the MA program into the black for Medicare. 4 We argue that a major contributor to the chronically poor performance of Part C is the inefficient sorting of beneficiaries between MA and TM caused by Medicare's premium policy. In this paper, we shift analytic focus away from plan payment and risk adjustment and to the premiums and the incentives faced by heterogeneous beneficiaries when they elect MA or TM. To address normative questions around beneficiary choice between MA and TM, we propose a formulation of which beneficiaries should be in MA 1 The Medicare Modernization and Improvement Act of 2003 renamed Part C plans as Medicare Advantage plans. Previously, plans were called Medicare+Choice plans. 2 For reviews of the literature on risk adjustment, see Newhouse (2002) or Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) . Broader themes regarding risk and variation are covered in Breyer, Bundorf and Pauly (2012) . 3 For recent analysis of payment changes from the ACA and plan response showing up in anticipation of these changes, see Afendulis et al. (2011) . 4 In addition to refining risk adjustment, Medicare has raised and lowered the overall level of payment to MA plans a number of times in the past 25 years depending on whether increasing access to MA plans or saving money were the dominant policy concern. McGuire, Newhouse and Sinaiko (2011) describe these changes and the plan and beneficiary response. The fundamental answer to who should be in MA underlies the title of the paper. We argue that MA should, from the standpoint of social welfare, draw beneficiaries from the thick central part of the distribution of preferences for health care, and in this sense make MA a "middle class" program.
In a simple model of beneficiary choice, we show that the present premium policy leads to a set of beneficiaries in MA that is far off from those who should be in MA.
Medicare (and social welfare) would be better served by a larger, better-financed MA program, targeted to the middle class. To get there requires a redesign of premium policy.
Our approach is based on the observation that beneficiaries vary in their demand for health care for many reasons. Most attention has been directed to the heterogeneity related to "health status" and the risk adjustment technology designed to deal with it (Pope et al., 2004) . Health status-based risk adjustment explains a small share (10% or less) of the individual variation in health care spending, partly because health status is difficult to measure and predict. Another reason, and one that we call attention to here, is that factors other than health status -income, education, "taste" more generally 5 -also influence demand for health care, and therefore choice of plan.
From the standpoint of the beneficiary, anticipated demand for health care, together with the premiums for TM and MA, determine the best plan option. Premiums for TM are described below, and depend on the circumstances of the beneficiary. MA plans choose the premium beneficiaries pay (subject to Medicare regulation), and this premium is the same for all beneficiaries. There is a fundamental problem with this approach. Any single premium for MA does a poor job of sorting beneficiaries between 5 Income effects, for example, have been studied in health care. Cross-sectional studies generally report a positive income elasticity of demand that is less than one. The Rand Health Insurance Experiment found income elasticities of between .1 and .2 (Newhouse, 1993) . Studies using longitudinal variation in income find much larger elasticities, generally classifying health care as a "luxury good" with income elasticities exceeding 1.0. See Fogel (2008 6 Medicare also provides health insurance for qualified disabled beneficiaries below age 65. These beneficiaries may also choose to join the same MA plans on the same terms as the elderly beneficiaries. 7 Beneficiaries with short Medicare work histories and not married to a beneficiary with a long work history may pay a Part A premium but this applies to about 1% of beneficiaries CMS (2011). 8 In addition, there are penalties for delaying enrollment in Part B in the form of higher premiums (CMS, 2010). Part A and B benefits, and may supplement these benefits by reduced cost sharing or coverage for additional services not part of TM, such as vision or dental care (Gold, 2008 ). 10 MA plans may or may not include drug coverage. Those that do are referred to 9 In traditional Medicare, physicians are paid for each procedure according to a fee schedule. Hospitals are paid according to the diagnosis-related group (DRG) in which a patient is classified at discharge. The hospital payment system is partly "prospective," embodies some incentives to the hospital to economize on resources during the hospital stay. For an overview of Medicare payment policies applying to physicians, hospitals and health plans, See Newhouse (2002) . 10 Gold and her colleagues at Mathematica Policy Research have tracked policy, enrollment, plan types and other data on Part C for a number of years in a useful series of publications (Gold, 2009 and Gold et al., 2004 Beneficiaries in MA plans must pay the Part B premium (which goes to Medicare). 13 MA plans can charge a premium above this. Many plans, however, are 
Previous Research
A large literature in public finance is concerned with the public provision of private goods. Health care is a private good financed collectively for reasons, among others, related to equity. In Besley and Coate (1991), rich and poor consumers demand a good that could be provided by government with an equal consumption requirement, or left to the market. 14 Some redistribution to the poor can be achieved by providing a base level to everyone financed collectively by progressive taxes, and letting the rich opt out to the private system. Within a health care context, researchers study resource allocation in public systems, and how a private sector fringe affects public costs and efficiency (Barros and Siciliani, 2012) . Grassi and Ma (2008) analyze the interaction between a budget-constrained public health care system that allocates by rationing and a private sector that accommodates demand but may set prices. Consumers differ according to wealth and cost. The analogy to our paper is that our MA plan has an equal consumption feature, and the consumer has the option of choosing a TM plan that accommodates heterogeneity. In our analysis of Medicare, however, the alternative system, TM, is also publicly financed and subject to regulation.
A focus on the premiums paid by beneficiaries recalls Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) who recognized the premium as a powerful selection device. In a Medicare context, the emphasis in the literature has been on skimping on services as a tool for selection. 15 Other papers stress that plan choice of benefits and premiums can serve beneficiary heterogeneity, as well as being a device for selection. 16 The idea, as 16 Another use of the premium in the context of private health insurance is for an employer to recover some of the inframarginal surplus health insurance benefits confer on high-demand employees (Miller, 2005) . 17 Restructuring the "choice architecture" in Medicare -limiting and clarifying the options -may be necessary for choice to serve beneficiaries. See McWilliams et al (2011) for recent evidence for how too many choices may lead to ineffective decisions, at least for the substantial share of the elderly who have some impairment in decision making. 18 Town and Liu (2003) , following methods proposed by Berry (1994) , use market share and premium (price) data to estimate consumer surplus and profits associated with Part C plans during the 1990s, when Part C rode the success of managed care throughout the US health insurance market, and plan and beneficiary participation was growing rapidly. They found that demand for HMO plans was inelastic to the premium, implying ample surplus to be divided between consumers and HMO plans. Beneficiaries had diverse tastes, but costs were assumed to be uniform, ruling out any selection issues by assumption. Bundorf et al. (2009) show, in their theoretical analysis, that any uniform price for health plans will generally not lead patients to efficiently sort themselves across plans.
They also estimate the efficiency loss due to this inefficient pricing in the context of a small group market in California. Glazer and McGuire (2011) model managed competition with demand heterogeneity to consider plan payment and enrollee premium policies in relation to efficiency and fairness. Specifically, this paper studies how to implement a "Silver" and "Gold" health plan efficiently and fairly in a managed competition context. The assumption shared with these two papers and the current one is that demand for health services and health insurance is driven by both tastes and need.
The current paper introduces demand heterogeneity in the context of Medicare, with beneficiaries faced with a choice between TM and MA. This specific application allows us to demonstrate the fundamental inefficiencies in current Medicare policy, and to identify new approaches to address these inefficiencies.
Utility and Willingness to Pay for MA and TM
Beneficiaries are heterogeneous in their demand for health care. A beneficiary's valuation of the quantity of health care, x, is positively related to a preference parameter, θ. Specifically, we assume that a beneficiary characterized by θ values health care at V(x, θ), with V x > 0, V xx < 0, V xxx ≤ 0, V θ > 0, V xθ > 0, and as a normalization, we assume V θθ = 0. 19 We also assume that θ ∈ �θ, θ�, F(θ) is the distribution function and f(θ) is the density function of θ. We assume that f(θ) has full support over the interval �θ, θ�. Quantity x is measured in dollars so the cost of x is 1. Efficient x for beneficiary θ is x*(θ), the solution to V x (x*,θ) = 1.
In order to focus on heterogeneity in demand from sources other than health status, we interpret θ as representing elements affecting demand for health care that the MA plan does not or cannot accommodate. Such elements could include income, education, and other dimensions affecting taste, so long as these elements are not recognized and responded to by the plan. In our model, individuals differ only in θ, 19 Most of our assumptions about the shape of V(x, θ) are intuitive and conventional. The assumption that V xxx ≤ 0 needs some discussion and this will be carried out after our presentation of Proposition 1, where it comes into play.
implying that demand varies only because of taste parameters. We make this assumption because we regard the clinicians in the managed care MA plan as trained and interested in gearing treatment to health status (more resources go to a patient with greater need),
but not in accommodating differences in "taste" for health care. The "equal consumption" assumption about MA plans refers to heterogeneity with respect to taste.
The economic literature on managed care is concerned with rationing in the presence of heterogeneity in demand, which is most often associated with health status differences. 20 Rationing can avoid moral hazard problems and improve efficiency, but an equal consumption feature of rationing creates inefficiency by homogenizing services to those with heterogeneous preferences. Essentially, this paper is about how to use the efficiency gains MA plans can create to best advantage among Medicare beneficiaries with heterogeneous preferences for health care. We now describe more specifically our models of MA and TM.
In MA there are no copayments. Since (by assumption) individuals differ only on dimensions not accommodated by the MA plan, quantity in MA is the same for everyone in the plan at x MA . Willingness to pay (or utility measured in dollars) for MA is simply:
U MA is positive for every value of θ and, given our normalization on V θθ , for a given x MA , it increases with θ at a constant rate.
We assume, in contrast to MA, TM does accommodate beneficiary demand due to heterogeneity in θ. In TM, beneficiaries pay a copayment 0 < c < 1 for each unit of x, and choose quantity to maximize utility by setting the marginal valuation of x equal to c:
We define x TM (θ) to be the solution to (2) above. Note that our assumption that V xθ > 0 implies that consumers with higher θ demand more care in TM. Willingness to pay for TM is then:
This is also everywhere positive, increasing in θ at an increasing rate. 21 Intuitively, this is because as demand shifts out, quantity increases (unlike in MA) and consumer surplus goes up approximately quadratically with quantity demanded.
Throughout the analysis we will focus on the case where x MA is located in the interior; by "interior" we mean that the level of care provided under managed care is higher than the level of care consumed by the lowest type, θ, under TM and lower than the efficient level of care for the highest type, θ, individual: 
Efficient Assignment
We consider how to efficiently divide consumers between MA and TM for a given x MA .
We establish (Proposition 1) that the optimal division of consumers between MA and TM is characterized by consumers in a single range of θ in MA with the others in TM. We will first present our result formally and then discuss the interpretation. Maximizing 21 Dropping the elements inside the parentheses we have:
social welfare (efficiency) requires dividing beneficiaries into the two insurance types based on social welfare defined as utility less cost. 22 Given an MA x , welfare in MA as a function of θ is given by:
And welfare in TM is given by: . Obviously, social welfare in MA and TM for this beneficiary must be the same in both MA and TM. Depicted in terms of the 22 Recently, perspectives from both "value-based insurance design" and behavioral economics have questioned the conventional welfare framework based on utility, adding to long-standing doubts about whether consumer choices should be regarded as a guide to welfare. See Chernew, Rosen and Fendrick (2007) for the proposal for the value-based approach, and Pauly and Blavin (2009) for an integration of the Pigouvian subsidy perspective into the conventional moral hazard framework. In a related point connected to behavioral economics, Newhouse (2006) illustrates how time-inconsistent preferences could lead to choices by consumers not in their best interest. As Pauly and Blavin (2009) show, however, consumer over or undervaluation can be integrated with traditional considerations of optimal health insurance. In this paper we take the conventional approach that utility is also the measure of his social welfare. 23 Notice that the θ 1 and θ 2 cutoffs depend on the x MA chosen. Rather than writing the cutoff as a function of x MA we stipulate that the discussion here applies for a particular value of x MA . 24 As can be seen in the proof of Proposition1, the fact that there are only two cutoffs follows from the convexity of ∆W(x MA , θ), which follows from, along with other assumptions about utility, our assumption that V xxx ≤ 0. If V xxx was sufficiently greater than 0, there could be some special cases where there would be more than two levels of θ at which welfare in TM was equal to the welfare in MA. We do not discuss these special cases here.
welfare loss against the first best level of care for this beneficiary, the shaded triangle welfare loss must be the same when x MA = x TM . For any θ lower than θ 1 , the beneficiary is still "over consuming" in both systems, but since x TM for a θ less than θ 1 would be less than x MA , the welfare loss in TM would be less than in MA. Thus, for any demand to the left of θ 1 , the beneficiary belongs in TM. For θ just greater than θ 1 , the welfare loss in MA is strictly less than the loss in TM. To see this, imagine shifting the demand shown in Panel A slightly to the right. The higher θ type is over consuming, but since x MA < x TM , the welfare loss due to over consumption is less in MA.
Panel B of Figure 3 
Implementation of Efficient Sorting
We now consider the premium policy required to implement the optimal division of beneficiaries between MA and TM, for a given x MA .
Beneficiaries sort themselves between MA and TM based on their willingness to pay for each alternative and the relative premiums. The difference in willingness to pay for MA and TM, which we refer to as ΔU, is a function of θ:
Beneficiaries compare this difference to the difference in premiums between the two options and choose the option with the highest net benefit.
The following Lemma regarding ΔU is central to our results about premium policies and beneficiary sorting.
Lemma 1:
The beneficiary whose utility in MA exceeds TM by the maximum amount is θ 1 (as given by Proposition 1), the marginal beneficiary defining the lower bound of the types who are more efficiently served in MA.
In other words, the beneficiary for whom social welfare is equal in MA and TM defining the low end of the θ distribution belonging in MA is the beneficiary for whom the difference in utility (before any premiums) is the maximum between the two options. Figure 5 shows why (with proof in Appendix). For a beneficiary with θ < θ 1 , the gain from MA is less since some of the services are valued at less than c.
For a beneficiary with θ > θ 1 , there is a cost sharing gain of cx MA but then a deduction because of the services lost with a value greater than c to the beneficiary. Thus, as θ moves away from θ 1 in either direction, the gain from MA is falling.
The unusual relationship between the private and social rankings of the alternatives poses a challenge for premium policy and sorting. Choice is based on utility and efficiency is governed by social welfare. The challenge is this: of the beneficiaries with the same net private utility in MA (those just to the left and right of θ 1 ), some (those to the left of θ 1 ) should be directed into TM, and some others (those to the right of θ 1 )
should be directed into MA. As we will show, no single premium can achieve this desired sorting. It should be emphasized that the result presented in Lemma 1 is quite general as it follows only from our assumptions about the shape of the individual's utility function, V(x, θ), which are conventional, and on the way the level of service is determined in MA and in TM.
By Lemma 1 we know that for all θ > θ 1 , U TM (θ) increases at a rate faster than
, θ) and, hence, there exists a θ' > θ 1 such that U TM is equal to U MA at θ'. In general, θ' can be either smaller or larger than θ 2 depending on the level of the copayment c. In our analysis, hereafter, we focus on the relevant case where c is not too large and hence, U TM intersects U MA at a θ less than θ 2 . This situation is depicted in Figure 6 if there were no premiums for either alternative. The bolded (red) regions of the θ-axis flag the discrepancy between the beneficiaries who should be in MA and those who via utility maximization choose MA.
We consider now how the ranges of sorting can be affected by premium policy. That is, a premium schedule implements the efficient sorting if, given that schedule, all individuals of type θ, θ 1 ≤ θ ≤ θ 2 prefer MA over TM, and all other individuals prefer TM over MA.
Failure of Any Single Premium
The following proposition follows directly from Lemma 1:
Proposition 2: A single premium cannot implement the efficient sorting.
The proof is based on the following logic. According to Lemma 1, the premium beneficiary θ 1 pays for TM should make him indifferent between TM and MA so that beneficiaries with lower values of θ will not be willing to pay this premium and (efficiently) stay in TM. However, given Lemma 1, if type θ 1 is just indifferent between MA and TM, then all other beneficiaries strictly prefer TM over MA and they will all choose TM, which is obviously not what the first best calls for. 25 With the premium for MA set at zero, as we raise the single premium for TM, the first beneficiary willing to join MA is at θ 1 , but then, as the premium is raised further, MA attracts beneficiaries on both sides of θ 1 ; those on the right who we want in MA, and those on the left we do not. Lemma 1 identifies the severe handicap constraining the MA program based on a single premium policy. Any (single) premium attracting enrollment to MA brings in beneficiaries who would be more efficiently served in TM. Figure 7 shows the effect of a positive single premium for TM, shifting upward the net utility in MA. The positive premium moves some beneficiaries who should be in MA from TM (those just to the right of the θ' in Figure 6 ), initially improving efficiency.
Beneficiaries to the left of θ 1 continue to make the wrong choice. Eventually, further increases in the single premium for TM will lead to inefficient choices in the range above θ 2 as well. There is no way to manipulate the single premium (positive or negative) to attain the efficient sorting.
Implementing Efficient Sorting Requires Two Premiums
From Proposition 2 we know that at least two premium levels are necessary to implement the efficient assignment. In Proposition 3 we describe how premiums need to depend on θ to lead to an efficient division between MA and TM. The premium policy uses two premium levels y 1 and y 2 , where y 1 (y 2 ) is the level of premium that would make type θ 1 (θ 2 ) just indifferent between MA and TM. The premium y 1 (y 2 ) is paid by all individuals of type θ < θ 1 (θ ≥ θ 1 ) if they choose to be in TM. 
The premium policy: y(θ) = y 1 if θ < θ 1 , and y 2 if θ ≥ θ 1 , implements the efficient sorting. in MA, but is not enough for the very high-demand types, those with θ < θ 2 , and they go to TM (where they belong).
There are obviously other premium policies that would also sort beneficiaries efficiently (for example, the subsidy for TM need not be equal to y 1 for all the beneficiaries below θ 1 , but the (y 1 , y 2 )-policy we describe is the simplest -the only twopremium policy that does the job.
Second-Best Assignment Using a Single Premium
The two-premium policy described in Proposition 3 relies on the regulator using θ as a basis for premiums. Such a policy may not be feasible as the factors behind θ, e.g., education, attitudes towards health and health care, are not easily observable by the regulator and even if observable, cannot be used as a basis for a premium policy. If θ cannot be used to set premiums, the regulator must pick just one premium to sort beneficiaries, and we know from Proposition 2 that the socially efficient sorting cannot be implemented. The question then becomes what is the optimal (second-best) single premium to sort beneficiaries between MA and TM?
When the regulator chooses a single premium for TM, y, and the level of care is The first case is of more practical significance, since Medicare's single premium policy leads to a positive premium for TM, when the medigap and Part D premiums are factored into the picture. This is the case we select for analysis. How should consumers be divided between MA and TM in this case? We characterize the second-best assignment in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4:
Assume that x MA is given and let θ' denote the second-best efficient cutoff given that a positive premium is implemented for TM (i.e., y > 0). Then, θ' = θ 2 where θ 2 is the first-best cutoff given by Proposition 1.
The second-best policy must accept that the low-demand beneficiaries (with the lowest willingness to pay for TM) will be in MA. With x MA given, the tradeoff on the upper end of the distribution of demand is unaltered from the first-best case, the same cutoff, θ 2 , will be the target of the TM premium. Thus, the single-premium (given an x MA ) is y 2 from Proposition 3.
Efficient Level of Care
Now suppose that Medicare can set the level of x MA by altering the level of its payments to plans. 26 How should x MA be set if Medicare's objective is to maximize social welfare?
We will first consider the first-best where we assume that Medicare can implement efficient sorting by using a premium policy such as the one discussed in Proposition 3.
We next restrict Medicare to use a single premium and, hence, the best it can achieve is a second-best sorting as described in Proposition 4.
The First-Best Level of Managed Care
Suppose that Medicare can implement efficient sorting as given by Proposition 1.
We can then express social welfare as the sum of three integrals, and the efficient outcome is given by the solution to the following problem: 26 The relation between payment level (the benchmark) and services available in MA, x MA , depends on the market structure of MA plan supply. Competition among MA plans implies they will make zero profit by maximizing the welfare of a representative beneficiary choosing MA. If the sector is not competitive, there will still be a positive relationship between Medicare payment and services chosen by the MA plans. In this paper we are focusing on premium policy and so do not introduce a particular model of plan behavior and MA sector equilibrium. 
The Second-Best Level of Care with a Single Premium
Suppose now that y > 0 and the premium implements a single cutoff.
Proposition 5:
When a single premium is implemented, the (second-best) efficient level of care is lower than the first-best level of care. 27 Another consideration is the relative welfare cost of over-consumption for beneficiaries with different values of θ. If higher θ individuals had more elastic demand, there would be more social gains to including them in MA and θ 2 would be higher. In the proof of Proposition 1, we need to rule out cases in which there are "islands" of unusual demand elasticities for some values of θ. For example, if there were a bunch of beneficiaries with perfectly inelastic demand, they could be safely put in TM with no welfare cost. The assumptions above about third derivatives of utility rule out these unusual islands.
When the single premium is positive there is a single cutoff and beneficiaries with a low θ are in MA, whereas in a first best these low-demand types would be in TM. This will lower the efficient x MA , implying that the second-best high-end cutoff will fall below θ 2 . Thus, in this case, services in MA will be lower than in the first best and too few higher θ beneficiaries will be in MA.
Discussion
Part C of Medicare has been a disappointment for more than 25 years. Our paper identifies one fundamental reason for this. Policies governing the premiums for MA plans and TM lead to inefficient distribution of beneficiaries between the options.
Although our model does not generate quantitative conclusions, the character of the optimal equilibrium is so different from what we see in practice that we are confident that the welfare losses associated with current policy are large. Enrollment in MA has vacillated between 10 and 25% in the past 15 years, and is likely to be driven down from its recent 25% highs with cuts in plan payments set in the ACA. Each MA plan sets its own "single premium." Premiums for TM are highly subsidized and also do not vary according to demand-related factors.
We argue that MA should be directed to serve the large middle part of the distribution of demand for health care -what we refer to as the "middle class." Instead, current premium policies encourage MA plans tend to attract beneficiaries with lower demand, both for reasons of better health status and for non-health status factors. 28 Increasing pressure on public budgets mean two things for Medicare Advantage (MA): first, it is even more important for Medicare to achieve the savings potential of managed care plans; second, in one form or another, beneficiary premiums (rather than tax-supported payments) will play a larger role in financing Medicare, both on the TM 28 After adjusting for health status, there is an inverse relationship between income and other indicators of socioeconomic status and the likelihood that beneficiaries join an MA plan. Balsa, Cao and McGuire (2007) studied enrollment choices of 65+ Medicare beneficiaries not on Medicaid using five years of data from two sources, the National Health Interview Survey and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey. Lower income groups, lower education groups and members of racial/ethnic minorities were more likely to join MA, after adjustment for self-assessed health status, the presence of a series of other health conditions, age, gender, and other factors. The Kaiser Family Foundation, with more recent data, report that MA enrollees are more likely to be poor (and report poor health) than beneficiaries in TM (KFF, 2008).
and the MA side. Premium policy will inevitably be reformulated for financing reasons, yielding an opportunity to get more and more of the right beneficiaries in improved MA plans.
A comprehensive discussion of restructuring Medicare policy towards MA requires consideration of issues not addressed in this paper, including: the costeffectiveness and quality of care in MA plans compared to TM; the desirable forms of MA plans; the level of the benchmark payment and bidding; the role medigap and employer plans; regional differences in patterns of care; the "choice architecture" for MA plans and the setup of the default option; the broader (spillover) effects of Medicare MA policy on health financing systems; and equity-distributional concerns in terms of richpoor, healthy-sick and young-old.
While noting these concerns, we point out here two implications of our analysis of premiums and beneficiary sorting. First, our main message is that the premium for joining TM should be higher for higher-demand beneficiaries. Socially, there is more to be gained by keeping these high-demand types in MA. Currently, the Part B premium is mildly income-related, but the beneficiary pays the same premium whether they join an MA plan or stay in TM. We recommend that the income-related portion of the Part B premium be waived if the beneficiary elects MA. This simple step now would open important options down the road. In the future, as more is asked of beneficiaries in terms of premium, widening the premium differences by income will work towards the premium discrimination called for in our analysis.
Second, the structure is also in place to create options attractive to low-demand beneficiaries. Low income/asset Medicare beneficiaries qualify for special premium and cost sharing subsidies through state Medicaid programs, thus encouraging them to join managed care plans. Translating some of the subsidy into income support if these beneficiaries choose economical Medicaid managed care plans would could make beneficiaries better off and reduce public health care spending.
More broadly, our analysis implies that Medicare should take a direct hand in setting premiums for MA plans. Although it would represent a big change for Medicare, there is nothing radical about a sponsor setting premiums for plan options. Virtually all large private employers do this, setting the price employees pay for any health plans Our analysis leaves a number of questions unanswered. Incorporation of an explicit analysis of MA plan behavior should be high on the agenda. Within a population of heterogeneous beneficiaries, many MA plans setting different levels of services will better serve diverse tastes than a single MA product.
Although we are able to make our main points in an analysis abstracting from heterogeneity in health status, issues related to risk adjustment and MA plan resource allocation according to health need also need incorporation. One could ask our question:
who should be in MA along dimensions of health status as well as taste for health care.
With new data becoming available on what goes on inside the black box of managed care plans, empirical patterns of care in MA and TM can be compared, and theories about plan behavior can be assessed.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We define the difference between social welfare in MA and social welfare in TM to be:
The change in ∆W as θ changes is given by (recall that V θθ = 0):
The second equality follows from our definition of x TM (θ).
The curvature of the ∆W is given by:
The inequality follows from the fact that
V θθx = 0 and V θxx= V xx θ by our assumption that V θθ = 0.
Given X MA there exists a θ, call it θ MA , for which, x MA is socially efficient, that is V x (x MA , θ MA ) = 1 and, hence, ∆W(x MA , θ MA ) > 0. Furthermore, there exists another θ < θ MA , call it θ 1 for which x MA = x TM (θ 1 ) and, hence, ∆W(x MA , θ 1 ) = 0. By the concavity of ∆W, we know, therefore, that there exists at most one more θ, call it θ 2 , such that θ 2 > θ MA and ∆W(x MA , θ 2 ) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Using the envelope theorem one can see that:
We know that at θ 1 , x TM (θ 1 ) = x MA , and thus at θ 1 , ∆U/dθ = 0. Furthermore, by the linearity of U MA and the convexity of U TM we know that ΔU is convex with respect to θ.
Thus, ∆U is maximized at θ 1 .
Proof of Proposition 2:
Assume a single premium y for TM. For the premium to implement the efficient assignment it must be that -y + ∆U(x MA , θ) ≤ 0 for all θ < θ 1 and -y + ∆U(x MA , θ) ≥ 0 for θ > θ 1 . However, since with θ < θ 1 < θ and ∆U(x MA , θ) is maximized at θ 1 , the two conditions above cannot be met simultaneously.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Since y 
Proof of Proposition 4:
When y = 0 there is a single cutoff to the left of θ 2 . By increasing the premium the single cutoff moves towards θ 2 and welfare is increased. Once the cutoff reaches θ 2, welfare will be decreased if the premium is further increased. (See Figure 7. )
Proof of Proposition 5:
When y > 0, and there is a single cutoff between MA and TM, the second-best outcome is given by:
